2002-2026: An Assessment

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey approaches the completion of nearly a quarter-century in power, thus marking the conclusion of its initial phase. This period, spanning an entire generation, rivals the combined rule of Atatürk and İnönü from 1923 to 1950. Given the significant socioeconomic constraints of that earlier era, along with its limited governmental maneuverability, the 2002-2026 stretch emerges unmistakably as Turkey’s most dominant political epoch.

Throughout this extensive rule, the AKP accomplished five substantial transformations. Firstly, the party engineered the rise of an "Islamic" bourgeoisie—both large-scale and small—enabling its shift from provincial roots to urban prosperity. Partially secularized and increasingly worldly, this class has at times even attempted to transcend AKP’s ideological religious framework. Secondly, AKP dismantled the system of checks and balances. By undermining the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, the party eroded foundational aspects of rule of law, paving the way for autocracy. Thirdly, the AKP systematically demolished freedoms related to expression, media, and political critique, ushering Turkey into a post-truth society by elevating misinformation and normalizing outright lies. Fourthly, AKP dissolved the traditional political role of the military as a self-appointed guardian of the regime, replacing it with military and paramilitary groups loyal solely to autocratic rule, strategically positioned against each other to safeguard regime stability. Finally, by fully empowering religious sects to build their own economic and social ecosystems, the AKP enabled some of the most corrosive forms of religion’s instrumentalization in politics.

Between 2002 and 2015, the AKP indeed delivered improvements across various economic and social indicators—boosting overall economic growth, industrial production, healthcare, education, agriculture, and infrastructure. Yet, the policies enacted post-2015 effectively dismantled these achievements. Significant declines in wealth, equality, income distribution, employment, and development were accompanied by a steep erosion in freedom, solidarity, justice, public ethics, and cultural vibrancy.

Underlying these regressions was the sprawling patronage system erected and solidified by the AKP, now so entrenched as to breed an institutionalized indifference. Rampant corruption, relentless plundering of national resources, and the enrichment drive of the patronage network culminated in Turkey failing to surpass the fate of a Middle Eastern nation squandering its human and natural potential.

In foreign affairs, the AKP rapidly abandoned its initial EU-compliant posture, instead navigating between global powers—namely the U.S., EU, Russia, and China—to carve out regional autonomy. While occasionally successful, such maneuverings were driven more by pragmatic opportunism than ideological coherence or strategic vision, rendering Turkey's long-term international benefits questionable. The Kurdish issue initially saw attempts at resolution, yet later abandonment underscored similar opportunistic calculations, exploiting rather than genuinely addressing social peace.

After twenty-five years, AKP's deeply embedded autocratic patronage structure faces mounting pressure amid widespread societal unrest triggered by aggressive attempts to neutralize political opposition. Clearly, this is no ordinary transition of power but rather a profound struggle over political and social paradigms, hinting at fierce resistance surpassing typical reactions to mere electoral defeat. Anticipating its own dismantling, the autocracy is likely to escalate its use of force, individually and collectively, to unprecedented levels.

Yet two factors offer hope: firstly, a public—particularly the younger generation—that has reached the limits of its patience, and secondly, emerging fissures within the autocratic patronage coalition itself. Early indicators of internal collapse could rapidly spread, engulfing organizational structures and parliamentary dominance akin to a wildfire.The dramatic spectacle of who will seek refuge through which emergency exits remains to be seen.

It is scarcely an exaggeration to frame this struggle as Turkey’s second War of Independence, arising organically from widespread public resolve. Significantly, the CHP, long reluctant to fully commit, appears finally ready to shoulder its historical responsibility. It nonetheless remains crucially insufficient to treat this as solely CHP’s battle. Indeed, significant segments in Anatolia, critical of AKP yet deeply distrustful of CHP, underscore the urgent need for inclusive opposition structures. A nationwide coalition of opposition politicians, local governments, farmers, workers, civil society, and professional associations involving groups such as teachers and health workers, transparently organized and broadly inclusive, is essential.

For this movement to reveal its true strength, it must expand far beyond anti-AKP urban strongholds into the rural heartlands, evolving into a contemporary “Anatolian Defense of Rights Movement.” Only then can Turkey genuinely embark upon meaningful democratic renewal.