Introduction
Selahattin Demirtaş, the former co-chair of
the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), has been imprisoned since
November 2016 on terrorism-related charges. His jailing was part of a broader
crackdown that decimated the HDP’s leadership and ranks. Initially, Demirtaş’s
arrest sparked anger and street protests by Kurdish communities and supporters
– demonstrations that were quickly met with mass arrests, tear gas, and water
cannons. Yet in the years following, public or political mobilization in support
of Demirtaş has remained relatively muted. This stands in stark contrast to the
strong, visible support that opposition figures like Ekrem İmamoğlu (of the
secular CHP) have garnered when facing government pressure. This report
examines the reasons behind this disparity, exploring sociopolitical dynamics,
strategic choices, institutional pressures, and evolving public sentiment among
Turkey’s Kurds since 2016.
Background: Demirtaş’s Imprisonment and
Initial Reactions
Demirtaş rose to prominence as a
charismatic, moderate voice for Kurdish rights and broader Turkish democracy,
even earning comparisons to Nelson Mandela. His HDP had scored unprecedented
electoral successes in 2015, helping deny President Erdoğan’s party a majority,
and he ran for president in 2014 and 2018. However, after the collapse of the
Kurdish-Turkish peace process in 2015 and the failed coup attempt in 2016, the
Turkish state moved decisively against Kurdish political actors. In November
2016, Demirtaş and several HDP MPs were arrested in a sweeping anti-HDP
operation. Courts ordered the detention of nine HDP lawmakers (including
Demirtaş) on terror charges, after parliament – with tacit CHP consent –
controversially lifted their immunity earlier that year. This crackdown aimed
to “decapitate” the Kurdish political movement by removing its most popular
democratic leader.
Outrage over Demirtaş’s jailing led to
protests in various cities, especially in the predominantly Kurdish southeast
and in Istanbul. However, these demonstrations were swiftly suppressed. Dozens
of demonstrators were arrested at a number of rallies nationwide, with
security forces using tear gas in Istanbul and water cannons in Ankara to
disperse crowds. The state of emergency declared after the 2016 coup attempt
created an atmosphere in which dissent – particularly Kurdish dissent – was
easily criminalized. The harsh response in those early days set the tone,
instilling fear that any overt support for Demirtaş could be met with
punishment.
A Stark Contrast: Support for İmamoğlu
vs. Demirtaş
In contrast to Demirtaş’s plight, when
Istanbul’s CHP mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu faced political threats (such as a 2019
election rerun and a 2022 conviction aimed at banning him from politics), he
enjoyed mass public support. Huge crowds rallied in Istanbul to defend
İmamoğlu’s democratic mandate, seeing him as a symbol of opposition to
Erdoğan’s rule. Even under police restrictions, daily rallies in front of
Istanbul’s City Hall drew tens of thousands across opposition sectors. This
difference raises the question: Why haven’t Turkish Kurds mounted a similar
sustained mobilization for Demirtaş? Several interlocking factors help explain
this disparity. İmamoğlu, as a CHP figure, appeals to a wide coalition of
opposition groups (secularists, centrists, some conservatives, etc.), while
Demirtaş’s support base is largely Kurdish and leftist. Many non-Kurdish Turks
who protested for İmamoğlu remain hesitant to champion a Kurdish leader
unfairly branded as a “terrorist” by the state. Conversely, Kurdish activists
have often stood alone, without broad Turkish public support, when their
leaders are targeted.
İmamoğlu’s case (overturning an election
result, or a ban on a popular mayor) was seen as an immediate threat to
Turkey’s democracy that united the opposition. Demirtaş’s imprisonment, though
a glaring injustice, has tragically become part of an ongoing, long-term
repression of Kurds – a struggle that many in the Turkish opposition view as riskier
or less relatable to rally around openly.
The contrast is also rooted in narratives:
İmamoğlu is framed as an innocent democrat facing authoritarianism, whereas
pro-government propaganda paints Demirtaş as a terrorist collaborator. This
propaganda, combined with Turkey’s ethnic divides, makes it harder to galvanize
widespread street support for Demirtaş beyond his core base.
State Repression and the Fear Factor
One of the strongest deterrents to public
mobilization for Demirtaş has been the fear of state repression. Since 2015,
and especially after 2016, the Turkish state’s response to Kurdish political
activism has been draconian. Key examples illustrate this climate: In the years
after Demirtaş’s jailing, thousands of HDP members and Kurdish activists have
been imprisoned on terrorism charges. By early 2018, roughly “almost 12,000 –
or a third of HDP members – had been detained and sent to jail” by Erdoğan’s
regime. As of 2019, at least 10 HDP parliamentarians (including Demirtaş) and
46 Kurdish mayors were behind bars, alongside thousands of party activists,
effectively gutting the HDP’s organizational capacity. This unprecedented
crackdown signaled to Kurdish communities that any protest or overt support
could invite harsh repercussions. Indeed, the “draconian state response has
left little room for Kurdish political expression.”
Nearly all elected Kurdish mayors from the
2014 and 2019 local elections were removed by the government and replaced with
state-appointed trustees. This not only disenfranchised Kurdish voters but also
undercut grassroots organizing. Communities saw that even successful, peaceful
political participation (electing mayors or MPs) was nullified by Ankara. This
fosters a sense of futility: why protest or vote if the state will simply
override Kurdish voices? Many Kurds have thus been demotivated from open
activism, focusing instead on preserving what space remains.
Kurdish gatherings often face blanket bans.
Even long-running civil initiatives like the “Saturday Mothers” (relatives
protesting disappearances since the 1980s) are routinely disrupted by police.
Newroz (Kurdish new year) celebrations and other cultural events are heavily
policed. This constant surveillance and intervention create a chilling effect.
One activist, speaking in 2023, noted that “mobilizations are rare,
[and] the reflex to protest in the street has become quite unusual and risky
for ordinary citizens” under Erdoğan’s authoritarian climate.
The Kurdish populace, having witnessed the bloody fallout of past protests
(such as the 2014 Kobani demonstrations and the urban clashes of 2015-16),
understandably prioritize personal and community safety.
In summary, state violence and legal
persecution have dampened public mobilization. Each Kurdish family knows
someone imprisoned or oppressed for political reasons, cultivating a collective
trauma and caution. The price of dissent is perceived as exceedingly high – a
stark contrast to CHP-led rallies in Western Turkey, which, while not immune to
crackdown, have a comparatively safer space due to larger numbers and greater
media visibility.
Internal HDP Dynamics and Strategic
Choices
Another factor is the strategic
recalibration within the Kurdish political movement after Demirtaş’s
imprisonment. The HDP and its base had to adapt to survive. Demirtaş was not
only the most popular Kurdish politician but also a unique bridge between Kurds
and Turkish liberals. With him and other charismatic leaders in prison, the
HDP’s remaining leadership adopted a cautious, collective approach. The party
prioritized legal battles (to fight the closure case against it) and electoral
participation over street protests that could give the state a pretext for a
ban. This meant channeling activism into the ballot box rather than the
barricades. Indeed, since 2016 the HDP has often pursued a low-profile “third
way” – neither aligning fully with the Turkish opposition nor resorting to
violence – to protect its existence. Junior partners in HDP’s alliances
sometimes complained that the HDP became too narrowly focused on
self-preservation and the Kurdish issue, but given the existential threat, such
focus was arguably unavoidable.
In the late 2010s, HDP strategists made a
deliberate choice to eschew mass protests in favor of electoral impact. Most
famously, in the 2019 local elections, the HDP did not field candidates in
major western cities and tacitly supported CHP candidates. From his prison
cell, Demirtaş himself urged Kurdish voters to back the HDP in the southeast
but vote for the CHP’s Ekrem İmamoğlu in Istanbul – “support the HDP in
the east… and back the CHP in the west,” he advised. This strategy paid
off: HDP regained many Kurdish-majority municipalities, and the CHP won cities
like Istanbul and Ankara with Kurdish voter support.
It was a new form of activism – using the ballot to punish Erdoğan, rather than
confrontation in the streets. The success, however, was met with a backlash:
Ankara swiftly intensified repression after 2019, arresting more HDP members
and re-imposing trustees over elected mayors to sow discord within the
opposition and prevent effective cooperation.”
Despite incarceration, Demirtaş remained an
influential voice, often communicating via his lawyers on social media. By
2020-2022, he was commenting on daily politics, advocating Kurdish–Turkish
unity for democracy, and even openly criticizing the PKK’s resort to arms.
These statements, which were bolder and more conciliatory than the official HDP
line, fueled talk of a rift – some speculated a tension between Demirtaş and
both the HDP’s current leadership and the PKK. Internally, this may have caused
strategic ambivalence: Should the movement foreground Demirtaş’s moderate,
pro-peace messaging (risking backlash from hardliners), or keep him somewhat in
the background while focusing on collective leadership? The result was a measured
approach – the HDP certainly did not disown Demirtaş (he remains a hero to the
base), but organized campaigns specifically centered on him (such as a major
“Free Demirtaş” mass rally) were sparse. The party tended to frame Demirtaş’s
fate as one of many injustices under Erdoğan, rather than elevate him
singularly and risk further angering the regime or nationalists.
In essence, survival instincts and
strategic pragmatism shaped the HDP’s actions. Rather than street mobilization
for Demirtaş that could provoke bans or violence, the party bet on electoral
and legal resistance. While arguably effective in some instances (e.g.
contributing to opposition victories), this strategy inevitably meant less
public spectacle around Demirtaş’s imprisonment – a calculated trade-off.
Kurdish Public Sentiment and
Demobilization
How have ordinary Turkish Kurds themselves
felt and acted in Demirtaş’s absence? The sociopolitical mood in
Kurdish-majority areas offers important context. The breakdown of the peace
process in 2015 led to heavy fighting in Kurdish towns (like Sur, Cizre,
Nusaybin), where urban warfare between state forces and PKK-linked militants
caused massive destruction and civilian displacement. Many Kurdish civilians were
caught in the crossfire. According to analysts, “the fighting in the
cities in 2015-2016” inflicted deep trauma”,
and there remains “little appetite [among Kurds] for a return to [past]
levels of violence.”
This means that while Kurds deeply resent state repression, they are also wary
of any form of struggle that could escalate to violence or chaos. Public
protests, unfortunately, often carry the risk of violence when met with
heavy-handed policing. Thus, a kind of protest fatigue and fear has set in
among parts of the community – an understandable caution after years of
upheaval.
Many Kurds feel politically alienated and
cynical about Turkey’s opposition politics. They remember that in the June 2015
general election, liberal Turks voted for the HDP (then led by Demirtaş) to
block Erdoğan, but when Erdoğan turned around and cracked down on Kurds in late
2015, those Turkish allies did not mobilize to defend Kurdish rights. This left
a lasting bitterness. As one expert notes, Kurdish voters suspect they were “used
by Erdoğan’s Turkish opponents in June 2015 – and discarded once [Erdoğan’s
AKP] had been stripped of its majority”, with no follow-through on
Kurdish rights.
The same pattern seemed to repeat in 2019: Kurds delivered Istanbul to
İmamoğlu, but their support has not been rewarded with any discernible shift in
the CHP’s stance on the Kurdish issue. For instance, the CHP has remained
largely silent on freeing political prisoners like Demirtaş to avoid
nationalist backlash. This breeds resentment and demotivation: if even the
opposition takes Kurdish support for granted, why should Kurds stick their
necks out?
Among Kurdish communities, there is a
palpable sentiment of marginalization. “Kurds are only important for their
votes. And then what happens? Nothing. We remain second-class even in a
democracy,” said one Kurdish voter, who openly wonders if any new government
would truly free Demirtaş and “hundreds of others” wrongfully jailed.
Such doubt reflects a broader loss of faith. Demirtaş, once a figure of hope,
is now a symbol of unkept promises: he represented a democratic breakthrough
that never fully materialized. While Kurds admire his resilience (he has
written books and stayed upbeat in prison), many have shifted their focus to
daily hardships and local issues, expressing their dissent more quietly (or
just at the ballot box) rather than through large demonstrations that they
believe won’t change the outcome. In short, public sentiment has evolved from
hope to hardened realism – an acceptance that overt activism might do little
except invite repression, unless larger political changes occur.
The Turkish Opposition’s Approach:
Sidestepping the Kurdish Question
Another crucial piece is the stance of
Turkey’s broader opposition (CHP and its allies) toward Demirtaş and Kurdish
issues. This affects how much visibility and support Demirtaş’s cause receives
nationwide. The CHP, the main opposition party, has walked a tightrope
regarding the Kurdish issue. On one hand, its leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu has
decried the injustices of the Erdoğan regime and in principle opposes the
arbitrary imprisonment of politicians. On occasion, CHP figures have
acknowledged that Demirtaş (and others like Osman Kavala) are political
prisoners who should be released per European Court rulings. On the other hand,
the CHP has been reluctant to champion Demirtaş publicly or collaboratively
mobilize with the HDP, for fear of being smeared as “terrorist sympathizers” by
the government and losing nationalist voters. This was evident in CHP’s
lukewarm reaction to the 2016 HDP arrests – some CHP lawmakers even voted to
lift HDP immunities, and the party’s protest of Demirtaş’s detention was
largely symbolic. The result is a sense that Demirtaş has been isolated.
Opposition protests and marches (such as the 2017 “Justice March”) tended to
center on CHP’s own grievances, only implicitly including Kurdish prisoners
rather than naming Demirtaş front-and-center. No cross-opposition “Free
Demirtaş” rally ever materialized.
The opposition alliance has included
nationalist elements (e.g. the Good Party) that are openly hostile to the HDP.
This further sidelined Kurdish issues in the united opposition’s platform. For
instance, ahead of the 2023 elections, the multi-party opposition bloc
(excluding HDP) avoided any mention of Kurdish rights or Demirtaş’s status,
focusing instead on corruption and economy. HDP was kept out of the main
alliance to keep nationalists on board. In practical terms, this meant Demirtaş’s
imprisonment was not a rallying cause for the opposition’s campaign – it was an
awkward topic to be tip-toed around rather than a shared injustice to denounce.
Consequently, Kurdish voters observed that even the prospective alternative
government was not prioritizing their rights.
Political analysts have noted that the
opposition’s ambivalence has strategic costs. As analyst Gareth Jenkins pointed
out just before the 2023 elections, although Kurdish votes are likely to be
vital for the opposition to win, persuading Kurds to turn out is a challenge
when the CHP still struggles to overcome its historical legacy of suppressing
Kurdish identity. The CHP’s recent outreach remained superficial in Kurdish
eyes, because it did not include concrete solidarity like demanding Demirtaş’s
freedom. This lukewarm approach arguably feeds the cycle: Kurds feel abandoned
by the opposition, thus they mobilize less enthusiastically, which in turn
makes opposition politicians even more wary of visibly courting Kurdish causes.
It’s a vicious loop of caution. Only in backchannel or symbolic ways has
Demirtaş been part of opposition politics – for example, Demirtaş endorsed
Kılıçdaroğlu from prison in 2023, and HDP voters dutifully supported CHP’s
candidate, but the gesture was one-sided; post-election, the disappointments
remained.
In summary, the Turkish opposition has
largely compartmentalized the Kurdish issue: happy to quietly accept Kurdish
votes, but unwilling to mobilize around Kurdish leaders’ plight. This political
reality ensures Demirtaş’s situation never gains the nationwide urgency that
İmamoğlu’s did, further dampening public mobilization specifically on his
behalf.
Is Demirtaş Abandoned? Perceptions and
Reality
Given the above factors, a looming question
is whether Demirtaş is effectively “abandoned” – either by his own
movement or by the broader opposition – and how that perception influences
activism.
From the perspective of many Kurds, there
is a feeling that Demirtaş and the cause of Kurdish political freedom have been
neglected in Turkey’s fast-shifting politics. After nearly nine years behind
bars, with court order after court order ignored by the government (including
binding European Court of Human Rights judgments for his release), Demirtaş’s
case might appear hopeless. Each election brings a promise of change that has
yet to materialize into freedom for him. As one Kurdish voter, Asmin, bitterly asked:
“Will a new government free him [Demirtaş] and hundreds of others…?”
– a question laden with doubt. Such skepticism indicates that some Kurds indeed
feel Demirtaş has been left behind, his freedom no longer a priority on
anyone’s agenda except the HDP’s.
However, in reality Demirtaş is far from
forgotten within his community. He continues to be a symbol of resistance and
hope, albeit a subdued one. Demirtaş has written several books and stories from
prison, which have become bestsellers in Turkey and are widely read by Kurds
and sympathizers. This literary and moral presence keeps his profile alive. On
social media, Demirtaş’s witty and courageous messages (relayed via his
lawyers) are eagerly shared. His name is often chanted at Newroz celebrations
and HDP rallies, even if such gatherings are smaller or monitored. These are
subtle forms of solidarity that do not always make headlines.
The HDP (and its successor Green Left
Party) continuously brings up Demirtaş’s situation in parliamentary speeches
and international forums. Demirtaş’s family and lawyers routinely speak to
media (especially foreign media) to highlight his unjust imprisonment.
International human rights organizations and European institutions also
campaign for him. While these efforts haven’t freed Demirtaş, they prevent his
case from slipping into oblivion. It is a more institutionalized advocacy, as
opposed to mass street protests, but it exists.
There is a notion within Kurdish politics
of strategic patience. Many Kurdish voters have pinned their hopes on
long-term political change – for example, a future without Erdoğan – as the
moment when Demirtaş could finally be released. In the meantime, they
participate in politics in whatever constrained ways they can (voting, small
demonstrations, community organizing) without risking all-out confrontation. As
Jenkins observed, by 2022 a lot of pro-HDP Kurds continued to vote not out of
high hopes but as a stubborn assertion of their identity. This suggests that
Kurds have not given up on their cause or leaders, but they express their
commitment in low-key, persistent ways rather than dramatic mobilizations.
Thus, while Demirtaş might feel abandoned
at times – and he has occasionally alluded to disappointment that democratic
forces in Turkey haven’t been able to secure his release – he remains a potent
figure in the Kurdish imagination. The support for him has simply taken
different forms under repression. It is less visible but not absent. The
narrative of abandonment is, in part, a commentary on Turkey’s opposition
dynamics (as discussed) and on the imposed silencing of Kurdish voices, rather
than a literal abandonment by his people.
Evolution of Kurdish Political Activism
Since 2016
With Demirtaş in prison and open protest
stifled, Kurdish political activism in Turkey has adapted and evolved in
several notable ways. Despite state obstacles, Kurdish voters and the HDP
network have remained remarkably resilient at the ballot box. In every election
since 2016, they have reorganized under new party labels when necessary (for
example, running under the Green Left Party banner in 2023 to evade a ban) and
consistently passed the threshold to enter parliament. This electoral activism
– turning out to vote as an act of defiance – has been a cornerstone of the
strategy. It is activism through voting, ensuring Kurdish representation
endures in some form.
Kurdish activists have increasingly sought
common cause with other oppressed or marginalized groups in Turkey. The HDP
became the anchor of the “Labor and Freedom Alliance” with various left-wing
Turkish parties, emphasizing that their struggle is not solely ethnic but about
democracy for all. While this hasn’t translated into mass joint protests for
Demirtaş, it has broadened the Kurdish movement’s agenda and created new
avenues for solidarity (for instance, HDP supporting labor or feminist
protests, and vice versa). This is a shift from a solely Kurdish-focused
activism to a more intersectional opposition activism, conducted under heavy
scrutiny.
In the absence of national protests,
Kurdish activism often manifests in issue-based campaigns. Environmental
protests in the southeast (against mining or dams), women’s rights marches (in
which Kurdish women are very active), or language rights initiatives continue
at a grassroots level. These are smaller scales of activism where Kurdish
activists raise their voice, sometimes under less political heat than
explicitly pro-Demirtaş rallies would attract. Through such channels, they keep
pushing for rights and keep communities mobilized, albeit in fragmented ways.
Many Kurdish activists who fled Turkey or
who operate in Europe have carried the torch for Demirtaş abroad. Rallies in
European cities, lobbying of European Parliament and human rights bodies, and
international campaigns (like “Free Demirtaş” petitions) have been prominent.
These efforts maintain external pressure and awareness. Within Turkey, people
are aware of this global advocacy, but the domestic echo is limited by
state-controlled media which largely ignores Demirtaş’s plight or portrays him
negatively. Still, international support bolsters morale internally and keeps
the idea of justice alive.
Importantly, since 2016 the Kurdish
political movement has largely stuck to non-violent methods, even under extreme
provocation. This is a deliberate evolution. As noted, there is little public
appetite for resuming armed struggle or violent protests. Demirtaş himself has
consistently urged Kurds to pursue their goals through the political process,
rejecting the PKK’s violence. This ideological shift means Kurdish activism is
channeled into civil resistance and political expression, even if constrained.
It may not be as visible as clashes or huge rallies, but it represents a mature
strategic choice to fight for rights within the civic realm.
Overall, Kurdish activism since Demirtaş’s
imprisonment can be characterized as subdued but steady. The movement has been
in a defensive posture, trying to weather the storm of repression while keeping
the flame of political dissent alive in smaller, safer ways. It’s less about
spontaneous mass mobilization and more about endurance – “bend, not break” –
until a more open democratic space in Turkey might allow a resurgence of public
support for leaders like Demirtaş.
Conclusion
The limited public mobilization in support
of Selahattin Demirtaş post-2016, compared to the vibrant backing seen for
figures like Ekrem İmamoğlu, is the outcome of a complex interplay of fear,
strategy, and shifting political currents. Sociopolitical factors – including
the Kurdish community’s collective trauma from renewed conflict and a sense of
betrayal by erstwhile allies – have dampened the zeal for mass protests. Strategic
and institutional factors – such as the HDP’s decision to focus on elections and
avoid provocation under existential threat, and the brutal efficiency of state
repression in jailing leaders and criminalizing dissent – have further ensured
that Demirtaş’s support is often silent or symbolic rather than loud in the
streets. Meanwhile, Turkey’s broader opposition politics have largely sidelined
Demirtaş’s cause in pursuit of a cautious big-tent strategy, unintentionally
feeding Kurdish perceptions of being politically orphaned once their votes are
counted.
Crucially, however, to interpret this as
Kurds “giving up” on Demirtaş would be misleading. The Kurdish political
movement has not vanished; it has adapted. Demirtaş is still revered by many as
a courageous voice, and his ideas of peace and democracy continue to influence
Kurdish voters’ choices and the HDP’s platform. What has changed is the mode of
engagement: from fervent rallies to a more restrained resilience. In today’s
Turkey, a protest for Demirtaş might be small and quickly broken up by police –
but the next day, you will find Demirtaş’s face on a banner at a Newroz
celebration, a mention in an opposition speech, or a quiet vote cast in his
honor.
In sum, Demirtaş is neither fully supported
in the open nor truly abandoned in the heart of Turkey’s Kurdish populace. The
landscape of Kurdish activism has evolved into one of strategic patience and
subdued persistence, awaiting a political moment when advocating for leaders
like Demirtaş can be done without fear. Until that moment arrives, the support
for Demirtaş lives on in resilient, if less visible, forms – a testament to
both the oppressive weight of the Turkish state on its Kurdish citizens and the
enduring determination of those citizens to seek change through whatever means
remain available.
